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THE MYTH OF THE RELIABILITY TEST 
Brandon L. Garrett* & M. Chris Fabricant** 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and subsequent revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, was supposed to usher a reliability revolution.  This modern test for 
admissibility of expert evidence is sometimes described as a reliability test.  
Critics, however, have pointed out that judges continue to routinely admit 
unreliable evidence, particularly in criminal cases, including flawed forensic 
techniques that have contributed to convictions of innocent people later 
exonerated by DNA testing.  This Article examines whether Rule 702 is in 
fact functioning as a reliability test, focusing on forensic evidence used in 
criminal cases and detailing the use of that test in states that have adopted 
the language of the 2000 revisions to Rule 702.  Surveying hundreds of state 
court cases, we find that courts have largely neglected the critical language 
concerning reliability in the Rule.  Rule 702 states that an expert may testify 
if that testimony is “the product of reliable principles and methods,” which 
are “reliably applied” to the facts of a case.  Or as the Advisory Committee 
puts it simply, judges are charged to “exclude unreliable expert testimony.”  
Judges have not done so in state or federal courts, and in this study, we detail 
how that has occurred, focusing on criminal cases, where the vast majority 
of criminal cases are brought in state and not federal court. 
We assembled a collection of 229 state criminal cases that quote and in 
some minimal fashion discuss the reliability requirement.  This archive will 
hopefully be of use to litigators and evidence scholars.  We find, however, 
that in the unusual cases in which state courts discuss reliability under Rule 
702 they invariably admit the evidence, largely by citing to precedent and 
qualifications of the expert or by acknowledging but not acting upon the 
reliability concern.  In short, the supposed reliability test adopted in Rule 702 
is rarely applied to assess reliability.  We call on judges do far more to ensure 
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reliability of expert evidence and recommend sharper Rule 702 requirements.  
We emphasize, though, that it is judicial inaction and not the language of 
Rule 702 that has made the reliability test a myth. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1560 
I.  THE RELIABILITY TEST ....................................................................... 1565 
A.  Daubert and Reliability ........................................................... 1565 
B.  Rule 702 and Reliability ......................................................... 1566 
C.  Expert Reliability in Federal Courts ...................................... 1567 
II.  EXPERT RELIABILITY IN STATE COURTS ........................................... 1571 
A.  Overview of Study Findings .................................................... 1571 
B.  State Rule 702 Rulings ............................................................ 1573 
C.  Defense Experts ...................................................................... 1577 
III.  IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................... 1579 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1581 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 and subsequent revisions to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, was intended to usher in a reliability revolution, requiring 
judges to act as “gatekeepers” to exclude expert testimony lacking sufficient 
indicia of scientific validity.2  This modern approach to expert evidence 
frequently used in both civil and criminal cases is often summarized as a 
“reliability test.”3  In this Article, we examine whether it is in fact functioning 
as a reliability test, focusing on forensic evidence used in state criminal cases.  
We detail the use of that reliability test in states that have adopted the 
language of the 2000 revisions to Rule 702, collecting all opinions that cite 
to it.4  We find that even in rulings that do cite to Rule 702, state courts have 
neglected the critical language concerning reliability in the Rule and have 
instead reflexively cited precedent and the putative “flexibility” of the Rule 
to justify the admission of forensic evidence. 
Rule 702 states that an expert may testify if that testimony is “the product 
of reliable principles and methods,” which are “reliably applied” to the facts 
of a case.5  Or as the Advisory Committee puts it simply, judges are charged 
to “exclude unreliable expert testimony.”6  Legal and scientific observers 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments. 
 3. See, e.g., Jessica G. Cino, An Uncivil Action:  Criminalizing Daubert in Procedure 
and Practice to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 651, 655 (2016) (suggesting 
that Daubert fashioned “a new reliability test”). 
 4. See infra Appendix I. 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 702(c)–(d). 
 6. Id. r. advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments. 
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have noted that judges have largely not done so in state or federal courts.7  In 
this study, we detail how that has occurred in the larger body of state court 
rulings, where most criminal cases are brought.  We find that the reliability 
test in Rule 702 has largely been ignored.  More clear and prescriptive 
language or direct regulation may be needed to address the laissez-faire 
nonregulation of scientific evidence in criminal cases.8 
Legal and scientific scholars have much lamented the failure of modern 
scientific-evidence standards to address, much less remedy, the introduction 
of unreliable forensic evidence, including techniques that have been 
implicated in wrongful convictions.9  The use of invalid and unreliable 
forensic science has been documented in large numbers of cases later shown 
by postconviction DNA tests to have been wrongful convictions of innocent 
defendants.10  One of us has detailed the role that forensics played in those 
exonerations.11  The scientific community has repeatedly issued authoritative 
reports finding that unreliable and unscientific evidence nevertheless 
continues to be routinely admittedincluding evidence so unreliable that it 
is not “foundationally valid.”12  Scholars have been concerned that courts 
simply admit evidence based on precedent.13  Many evidence scholars have 
argued that first Daubert and then the revisions to Rule 702 in 2000 have not 
been evenhandedly applied in civil and criminal cases, even following 
adoption of new evidentiary standards.14  They have observed how judges tilt 
 
 7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  A PATH FORWARD 95–97 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 
/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLW3-Y6VQ]. 
 8. The term “scientific” raises the question of what types of expertise should be included 
in the concept of “science.”  We generally discuss in this Article expert evidence used in 
criminal cases.  We do not attempt to draw the distinction between scientific and technical 
expertise, and while the Supreme Court has raised in rulings like Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that not all forms of expertise have the same scientific 
underpinnings, id. at 147–49, courts have similarly not drawn firm lines between scientific 
and technical expertise.  Instead, the rules and court rulings highlight how concepts like 
reliability matter regardless of how one characterizes the expertise, whether technical or 
scientific. 
 9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 42; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. 
Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 
894–95 (2005). 
 10. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 11. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:  WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION (Daniel Medwed ed., 2017); Garrett & 
Neufeld, supra note 10. 
 12. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:  ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7–14 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R76Y-7VU] (finding that bite-mark comparison evidence, shoeprint 
evidence, and firearms evidence are not foundationally valid). 
 13. See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence:  Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from 
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1195–97 (2004). 
 14. See generally Cino, supra note 3; Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal 
Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381 (2007); Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme 
Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003); Peter J. Neufeld, 
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toward the prosecution to allow unreliable or unvalidated evidence in 
criminal cases and that judges may more carefully scrutinize evidence when 
the defense seeks to offer expert testimony.15  This has also been observed in 
civil cases, in which there may more commonly be a “battle of the experts” 
between both sides.16  Empirical study of judicial opinions on scientific 
evidence tends to confirm that concern.17 
A paradigmatic example of this lax approach in criminal cases is the 
anomalous jurisprudence associated with bite-mark evidence, a largely 
discredited forensic technique.18  In dismissing a civil rights suit brought by 
a man whose wrongful conviction was obtained largely through the 
introduction of bite-mark evidence, a federal court cited the technique’s 
“[s]ixty-three percent!” error rate and found it “doubtful that ‘expert’ bite 
mark analysis would pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in a 
case tried in federal court,” because Rule 702(c) requires that “expert 
testimony be ‘the product of reliable principles and methods.’”19 
In light of the data cited by this civil court, its findings are perhaps to be 
anticipated.  Yet just four months later, a criminal court in Florida admitted 
bite-mark evidence under that state’s version of Rule 702,20 which was 
adopted in 2013 and mirrors the federal rule.21  That court simply recounted 
the expert’s credentials, described the assay’s methodology and concluded 
that the proffered bite-mark testimony was the product of reliable 
principles.22  The lack of a statistical database to support the proposed 
testimony and the “limited studies” establishing an error rate were, according 
to the court, irrelevant—including the study finding error rates as high as 63 
percent—because bite-mark evidence “is a comparison-based science 
and . . .  the lack of such studies or databases is not an accurate indicator of 
its reliability.”23  Finally, the court undertook what amounted to a Frye 
 
The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005). 
 15. See supra note 14. 
 16. See supra note 14. 
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 12, at 87 (finding that 
“bitemark analysis does not meet the scientific standards for foundational validity, and is far 
from meeting such standards”); Michael J. Saks et al., Forensic Bitemark Identification:  Weak 
Foundations, Exaggerated Claims, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 538, 543–46 (2016); M. Chris 
Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm:  Forensic Science’s Overdue Evolution 
from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2016) (“Perhaps no discredited forensic assay has 
benefited more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper responsibilities than bite mark 
analysis.”). 
 19. Starks v. City of Waukegan, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1051–52 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 702(c)). 
 20. State v. O’Connell, No. 10-CF-12600-B, 2015 WL 10384608, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
30, 2015). 
 21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 2013). 
 22. O’Connell, 2015 WL 10384608, at *3. 
 23. Id. at *5 (“[B]ecause bite mark analysis is based partly on experience and training, the 
hard science methods of validation, such as assessing the potential rate of error, are not always 
appropriate for testing its reliability.” (quoting Coronado v. State, 384 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2012))).  The court found the absence of a valid error rate irrelevant to its 
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analysis, concluding that “bite mark identification or analysis has been 
accepted in Florida courts as early as 1984, and has been found to be 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community in other 
jurisdictions.”24 
For a more rigorous use of the modern reliability rule, a recent North 
Carolina appellate ruling in State v. McPhaul25 can be contrasted with the 
ruling in Florida.  The prosecution had introduced latent fingerprint 
comparison testimony at trial, and the expert testified that prints found at the 
crime scene matched the defendant’s known prints.26  The appellate court 
highlighted that in 2011 the legislature had amended Rule 702 to adopt the 
“federal standard,” which required that expert testimony “applied” principles 
and methods “reliably” in a case.27  When the expert testified about how she 
reached conclusions in the case, she could only say that she did so based on 
her “training and experience.”28  The appellate court emphasized that she 
provided no “detail in testifying how she arrived at her actual conclusions in 
this case.”29  As a result, the panel held that it was error to admit the 
testimony since there was no evidence that the methods and principles were 
reliably applied.30 
Rulings like the McPhaul opinion are especially rare considering the 
evidence was proffered by the prosecution, as we will detail.  Yet the 
adoption of Rule 702 in 2000 could have been expected to increase the focus 
of courts on the admissibility of expert evidence.  We focus here on state 
courts, where the vast bulk of criminal cases are brought in state and not 
federal court.  In state courts adopting the text of that rule, one might have 
expected to observe a change in focus to address questions of reliability more 
carefully.  In this Article, we examine state court rulings in criminal cases 
regarding the two reliability prongs of Rule 702(c), which requires that expert 
evidence be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and Rule 
702(d), which asks that those principles and methods be “reliably applied” to 
the facts of the case.  Thus, we did not identify or examine cases that did not 
result in a written opinion or cite to Rule 702 or its state equivalent. 
 
admissibility determination in Coronado; while the O’Connell court, citing Coronado, found 
a potential 63 percent error rate irrelevant to its Daubert ruling. Id. at *5 & n.3. 
 24. Id. (relying on the standard set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 
Cir. 1923), in which the admissibility of a novel form of expertise is assessed based on its 
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community).  It is worth noting that the court’s 
Frye analysis was also flawed because it defined the “relevant scientific community” as 
limited to bite-mark experts themselves. Compare id. at *1, *4 (assessing the reliability of a 
forensic odontologist based on the “techniques, materials, and methodology” of a forensic 
odontology standards and certification board), with State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 
P.2d 1266, 1285 (Ariz. 1982) (“This [general acceptance] requirement is not satisfied with 
testimony from a single expert or group of experts who personally believe the challenged 
procedure is accepted or is reliable.”). 
 25. No. COA16-924, 2017 WL 5145969 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017). 
 26. Id. at *8. 
 27. Id. at *7. 
 28. Id. at *8. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *9–10 (finding the error to be harmless given other evidence in the case tying 
the defendant to the crime scene). 
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Of the more than 850 cases identified that referred to reliability standards 
in their text, we identified 229 cases that quoted Rule 702 and then in some 
minimal fashion discussed one of its two reliability prongs.  In Appendix I, 
we supply this archive of state court rulings.  This archive should prove a 
useful resource for litigators and scholars seeking case law that discusses 
reliability across a host of forensic disciplines—from ballistics, to fingerprint 
comparisons, to cell-tower location, to drug analysis. 
Very few of those rulings, however, discussed the term “reliability” in any 
meaningful way, much less the two ways in which Rule 702 sets out 
reliability requirements.  State judges rarely addressed error rates or the 
consistency of forensic techniques between examiners or even consistency 
by the same examiner over time.  They chiefly ruled that the evidence should 
be admissible based on prior rulings admitting that type of evidence, the 
qualifications of the expert, and supposed general acceptance in the field 
(typically without carefully engaging with questions concerning which field 
is the relevant one).31  The few exceptions in which the reliability prongs of 
Rule 702 were more rigorously applied were largely in rulings excluding 
defense experts; thirty-four cases were rulings affirming the exclusion of 
such experts, while sixteen cases ruled that prosecution witnesses should 
have been excluded. 
Unfortunately, these findings are not surprising.  They track what had been 
observed in federal rulings on expert evidence in the years following 
Daubert’s adoption.  We discuss each of the federal appellate cases 
evaluating fingerprint evidence and its admissibility, and none of those panel 
rulings discuss the requirements of the post-2000 Rule 702.  As the bulk of 
criminal cases occur in state and not federal courts, this suggests that some 
new intervention is needed.  The language of Rule 702 is not the sole 
problem—after all, that language squarely addresses reliability, both of 
methods and their application to the facts.  That reliability language, 
however, has largely been ignored by state and federal judges.  More forceful 
language might make the importance of assessing reliability more salient to 
judges, perhaps with more detailed accompanying guidance in Advisory 
Committee notes. 
We suggest that Rule 702 can and should be improved by, for example, 
clarifying that precedent cannot serve as a proxy for reliability and that the 
threshold standard for expert qualification should be based on the objective 
proficiency of an expert.  Future efforts, however, must go far beyond the 
text of the rule.  Regulation of expert reliability and proficiency may be more 
important.  While such legislation and regulation exists in the area of clinical 
laboratories, efforts to enact such legislation have largely stalled at the federal 
level.  Some states have done more to examine and regulate the reliability of 
forensics, but such efforts have also been slow and idiosyncratic.  A 
 
 31. Other articles in this Symposium address that issue carefully, including Karen 
Kafadar’s piece describing the importance of statistical methods to forensics and the errors 
that can result when statistical expertise is not relied upon. See generally Karen Kafadar, The 
Critical Role of Statistics in Demonstrating the Reliability of Expert Evidence, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1617 (2018). 
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recognition that Rule 702 is not working as intended in criminal cases might 
add some impetus to such nascent efforts and national applicability. 
In Part I describes the Daubert ruling and its focus on reliability.  It then 
analyzes the 2000 revisions to Rule 702 and the reliability language adopted 
in those revisions.  Next, Part II presents an overview of the study findings 
and an analysis of the state court decisions that discuss state reliability rules 
in decisions regarding admissibility of expert evidence in criminal cases.  Part 
III goes on to discuss the implications of these findings.  It concludes that the 
supposed reliability test is largely not used to test reliability in criminal cases.  
This raises an enormous challenge because the language of the rule is quite 
clear.  It could be strengthened, but the larger problem seems to lie with 
judicial attitudes and approaches—not the text of the rule.  We discuss 
possible reforms to encourage better use of expert evidence in criminal cases, 
which others have long advanced.  We hope, however, that these empirical 
and qualitative findings help to show how the problem at both the state and 
federal levels requires urgent attention. 
I.  THE RELIABILITY TEST 
A.  Daubert and Reliability 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert transformed the adjudication of 
expert evidence in federal and also many state courts that adopted the same 
approach by focusing the inquiry on questions of the reliability and validity 
of the expert’s methodology and conclusions.32  The Daubert approach is 
often summarized as a “reliability test” for expert evidence.  What did the 
opinion actually say about reliability?  The Daubert Court stated that “the 
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”33  What does reliable mean?  The 
Court noted that the rules assume that “the expert’s opinion will have a 
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.”34  The 
Court also noted that “scientists typically distinguish between ‘validity’ (does 
the principle support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’ (does 
application of the principle produce consistent results?).”35  The Court stated 
that its emphasis on reliability in a case involving scientific evidence “will 
be based upon scientific validity.”36 
Apparently, then, the focus is on whether the principles relied upon support 
what they purport to show and not on consistency of results.  However, the 
Court separately discussed the need for a known or potential error rate and 
standards for the use of the technique, which relate to consistency of results 
or reliability.37  Thus, reliability and validity seem to be a part of the inquiry 
 
 32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (noting that the 
helpfulness consideration “has been aptly described . . . as one of ‘fit’”). 
 33. Id. at 589. 
 34. Id. at 592. 
 35. Id. at 590 n.9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 594. 
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called for by Daubert.  The reality is somewhat more nuanced.  On the one 
hand, the Supreme Court has since described the resulting “exacting 
standards of reliability.”38  On the other hand, the Court has described the 
Daubert inquiry as “a flexible one.”39  Federal trial courts have “considerable 
leeway” in determining “how to test an expert’s reliability.”40  And, “the 
relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or 
experience.”41 
B.  Rule 702 and Reliability 
In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to reflect the changes announced in 
Daubert and to make additional changes to the handling of expert evidence.42  
Rule 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an expert may testify if: 
(a)  the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c)  the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.43 
Our focus is on subsections (c) and (d), which both focus on “reliability.”  
What does reliability mean in those sections?  The Rule clearly calls for a 
higher level of scrutiny of the reliability of expert testimony than would be 
required under a Rule 403 analysis of the reliability of any type of evidence.44  
Rule 702 directs courts to assess reliability in the two specific ways noted 
and as part of a threshold inquiry.  The text of the Rule focuses on both the 
reliability of the principles and methods used by the putative expert and on 
the manner in which the expert applied those principles and methods to the 
facts of the case.  Both are important.  A method can be sound, but the expert 
can extrapolate a method beyond its validated application or apply that 
method to unsuitable facts or in an unsuitable manner.  A method can be 
reliable when applied carefully, but highly inconsistent or inaccurate in its 
results if it is applied poorly by a given expert.  Rule 702 clearly calls on a 
judge to scrutinize reliability both at the level of methods used and 
application in a given case. 
 
 38. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 39. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 594). 
 40. Id. at 152. 
 41. Id. at 150. 
 42. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
EVIDENCE RULES 5–8 (1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV05-
1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/V79Z-ZL2Z]. 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 44. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 precludes the introduction of “relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. r. 403. 
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The Advisory Committee notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 shed 
little further light on what is meant by “reliability,” although they do refer to 
the term.  The notes state, “If the expert purports to apply principles and 
methods to the facts of the case, it is important that this application be 
conducted reliably.”45  Both the notes and the way that reliability is discussed 
in the Rule suggest that scientific concepts of validity and reliability, as noted 
in Daubert, are relevant.  They are both concerned with whether the 
technique does what it purports to and whether it can produce consistent 
results as applied. 
To be sure, the Committee also noted that the Rule 702 “amendment is not 
intended to . . . preclude the testimony of experience-based experts.”46  The 
notes also emphasize, however, “An opinion from an expert who is not a 
scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for reliability as an 
opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist.”47  The notes also state, 
“In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great 
deal of reliable expert testimony.”48  Importantly, the expert must also be able 
to show “how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.”49  The 
Committee also stated that “[t]he evidentiary requirement of reliability is 
lower than the merits standard of correctness” since experts can reach 
different conclusions, including because they rely on different facts.  That 
experts might do so does not necessarily bar their testimony.50 
C.  Expert Reliability in Federal Courts 
Studies of the use of Daubert and Rule 702 have found a marked tilt toward 
civil litigation in the use of that expert gatekeeping standard.  Early studies 
showed that the bulk of federal cases citing to Daubert were in civil, not 
 
 45. Id. r. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical 
experience and extensive training and who explained his methodology in detail); Tassin v. 
Sears Roebuck, 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) (admitting a design engineer’s 
testimony when the expert’s opinions “are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and 
traditional technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the 
information and procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches”)); see also Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (stating that “no one denies that an expert might 
draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience”). 
 49. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments.  For criticism of 
the notes’ treatment of experience and the failure to recognize that experience can be assessed 
using proficiency tests to measure the reliability of subjective expertise, see Brandon L. Garrett 
& Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendments (quoting Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth. v. Brown (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
The Advisory Committee further explained that: 
[w]hen facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach different conclusions based on 
competing versions of the facts.  The emphasis in the amendment on “sufficient facts 
or data” is not intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an expert’s testimony on 
the ground that the court believes one version of the facts and not the other. 
Id. 
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criminal, cases.51  A study by Peter Neufeld noted that in the seven years after 
Daubert, there were just 211 reported challenges to the admissibility of 
prosecution expert evidence.52  During that time there were sixty-seven 
reported federal appellate decisions, and the government prevailed in all but 
six, with only one resulting in a reversed conviction.53  Neufeld called 
Daubert largely “irrelevant” to criminal justice.54  Some scholars, focusing 
on both civil and criminal cases, have observed that Daubert did not change 
the practice in federal or state courts, while others have found a qualitative 
difference and a measurably stricter analysis in civil cases in state and federal 
courts.55 
One study has also suggested that judges do not carefully apply factors in 
Daubert but rather look at more general features of testimony like the 
credentials of the expert, prior rulings admitting that type of evidence, and 
general acceptance by others in the field.56 
The reliability language in Rule 702, which is our focus in this Article, is 
widely perceived to have been neglected by federal judges.  While, as noted, 
there is an empirical debate whether Daubert and then Rule 702 made judicial 
review of admissibility of expert evidence more strict in practice, there is 
evidence that judges do not focus their review on the reliability inquiry.57  
For example, a 2014 Ninth Circuit ruling held that the reliability of principles 
and methods should be assessed but that the question whether they were 
reliably applied to the facts of the case could be left for the jury to decide.58  
As David Bernstein and Eric Lasker describe, “this is far from the only circuit 
court opinion to ignore amended Rule 702 in favor of more lenient 
admissibility standards” because federal appellate courts often cite and rely 
on Daubert or even pre-Daubert standards rather than the text of Rule 702.59 
 
 51. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability:  Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 104–05 (2000). 
 52. Neufeld, supra note 14, at S110. 
 53. Id. at S109. 
 54. Id. at S107. 
 55. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter?:  A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (finding that “a state’s 
adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in practice”); see also DAVID H. KAYE ET 
AL., THE NEW WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE:  EXPERT EVIDENCE § 6.3.2 (2d ed. 2010).  But see 
LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE 
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION, at xv (2001) (analyzing federal district 
court opinions and finding support for “stricter standards”); Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The 
Stricter Standard:  An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 
CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 680–81 (2013) (finding evidence, based on changes in removal rates 
from state to federal court depending on state court adoption of Daubert standards, that civil 
litigants view Daubert as more restrictive). 
 56. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 344–46, 
352, 358 (2002). 
 57. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation:  What Empirical Studies Tell 
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 126–37 (2005). 
 58. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 59. David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert:  It’s Time to Amend Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015); see also David E. Bernstein, 
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On the reliability prongs of Rule 702 specifically, as Victor Gold has put 
it, “when lower courts are confronted with expert testimony in disciplines 
outside of science, they follow Daubert but struggle to identify concrete 
factors indicative of reliability in the specific area of expertise at issue.”60  
One reason why, according to Gold, is that “[r]eliability is not exactly the 
same thing as trustworthiness, but it’s a broad concept.”61 
In criminal cases, this has been particularly true.  One example is in the 
area of latent fingerprint testimony.  Of the federal appellate courts to have 
discussed the question whether fingerprint testimony is admissible, none 
have actually addressed the question of reliability under Rule 702 by 
claiming to apply the requirements of Rule 702(c) and (d).  All of the federal 
courts of appeals except the Second Circuit have considered whether 
fingerprint identifications should be admissible, and all but a Ninth Circuit 
ruling occurred after the 2000 revisions to Rule 702.62  Yet those rulings do 
 
The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 
35–40 (2013). 
 60. Victor Gold, The Three Commandments of Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1622 (2017). 
 61. Conference on Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 807, and 
801(D)(1)(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1552 (2017). 
 62. See United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that Rule 702 
governs but not quoting or discussing any of the requirements of the rule and stating that the 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence was “properly taken for granted” (quoting Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999))); United States v. Watkins, 450 F. App’x 511, 
515–16 (6th Cir. 2011) (failing to discuss the requirements of Rule 702 and noting that, despite 
the expert’s “mistaken” claim that there is no error rate in fingerprinting, the error rate is just 
one of several factors to be considered and further noting that examiner testified regarding 
“the system of proficiency testing within her lab” at the Daubert hearing); United States v. 
John, 597 F.3d 263, 275 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the error rate is low” and without 
discussing the requirements of Rule 702 and stating that no Daubert or Rule 702 hearing was 
required for fingerprint evidence); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989–92 (10th Cir. 
2009) (finding that reliable identifications may be made and citing to the manner in which law 
enforcement agencies have “extensively” used fingerprint evidence for “almost a century” but 
not discussing the requirements of Rule 702); United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 
(8th Cir. 2008) (failing to discuss the requirements of Rule 702 but noting that fingerprint 
evidence has been recognized by other courts as “generally accepted” (quoting United States 
v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003))); United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 264–
66 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing, in an immigration case, the requirements of Rule 702 but 
finding that the defendant did not sufficiently preserve reliability-related objections at trial and 
finding no error regardless because the defendant asked questions relating to reliability of the 
method during the trial); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “[w]e agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint 
evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert” and quoting the text of Rule 702 but failing 
to discuss or analyze the requirements of Rule 702); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 
(8th Cir. 2004) (calling fingerprint evidence generally accepted and finding that the defendant 
did not sufficiently preserve the question of the evidence’s reliability); United States v. 
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 238–46 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the adoption of the 2000 
amendments to Rule 702 but not quoting or analyzing its text or requirements, instead 
discussing reliability generally under Daubert and rejecting defense evidence that raised 
objections regarding the admissibility of fingerprint testimony, including a concerning over 
error rates); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding fingerprint 
testimony admissible and noting the view that fingerprinting has a “low rate of error” without 
discussing the requirements of Rule 702 in any detail); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 
269–73 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that Rule 702 applies but not quoting or discussing its text or 
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not claim to apply the Rule 702 “reliability” language; most do not even quote 
the text of the Rule.  They instead largely discuss the factors set out in 
Daubert rather than the requirements set out in Rule 702.  In doing so, they 
typically do not conduct any meaningful analysis of reliability of fingerprint 
evidence.  Several courts discuss error rates in a limited way, noting that the 
error rate is “low” or crediting the experience of the fingerprint examiner and 
the description of the methods used as reliable ones, even in the absence of 
data to support that assertion.63  These courts have largely sidestepped 
questions regarding reliability of the method and reliability as applied under 
Rule 702(c) and (d).  These courts of appeals instead say that whatever the 
error rate is, it must be low; they may discuss the experience of the particular 
examiner; and they emphasize that fingerprint evidence has long been 
“generally accepted.”64 
For example, in one of the more detailed among these opinions—the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2009 ruling in United States v. Baines65—the panel emphasized that 
fingerprinting is “reliable” not based on scientific studies, which have 
documented error rates, but based on a century of common use by law 
enforcement.66  Thus, although the panel mentioned error rates and 
reliability, it actually conducted what amounted to a Frye “general 
acceptance” analysis.  Since the defendant raised the understandable concern 
that not only was Frye displaced by Daubert but also that a rote analysis of 
factors under Daubert is not the proper analysis post-2000 amendments to 
Rule 702, the panel acknowledged that it “need not either accept or reject this 
contention.”67  Without conducting a Rule 702 analysis, the panel simply 
noted that the Rule 702 analysis is “a flexible one.”68 
Or take the Third Circuit ruling in United States v. Mitchell,69 in which the 
panel acknowledged a lack of testing of the reliability of fingerprint 
testimony.  The panel instead relied on a “long history of implicit testing”—
in which fingerprint experts have conducted analysis in their casework and 
 
reliability requirements, citing to a long history of admissibility and the expert community’s 
claim of a very low error rate, and noting that “[i]n sum, the district court heard testimony to 
the effect that the expert community has consistently vouched for the reliability of the 
fingerprinting identification technique over the course of decades”); United States v. 
Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding, in a pre-2000 amendments case, that 
fingerprint testimony is generally accepted).  In George, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its prior 
ruling in United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). See George, 363 F.3d at 672.  
In Havvard, the court noted that Rule 702 applied but did not quote its text or discuss its 
requirements. See Havvard, 260 F.3d at 599–600.  Instead, the court quoted Daubert and 
Kumho Tire and concluded that the known “error rate” factor was satisfied because the expert 
testified that the error rate for fingerprint comparison was “essentially zero.” Id. 
 63. See supra note 62. 
 64. Baines, 573 F.3d at 991–92.  See generally supra note 62.  At the same time, courts 
have precluded questioning examiners on known misidentifications in latent fingerprint cases. 
See United States v. Bonds, No. 15 CR 573-2, 2017 WL 4511061, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 
2017). 
 65. 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 66. Id. at 989–90. 
 67. Id. at 991–92. 
 68. Id. at 992. 
 69. 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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not reported making errors—and on evidence that the error rate they report 
is “very low.”70  In effect, that panel substituted experience, as self-reported 
by fingerprint examiners, for reliability.  At the same time, the panel claimed 
that in its analysis “[r]eliability remains the polestar.”71  In a dissent, one 
Fourth Circuit judge explained that there was simply no evidence of 
reliability:  “The government did not offer any record of testing on the 
reliability of fingerprint identification” and “[t]he history of fingerprint 
identification and the dogged certainty of its examiners are insufficient to 
show that the technique is reliable.”72  Such rulings, even in dissent, are 
vanishingly rare in federal courts.  The majority opinion in that case, like in 
the other circuits, did not discuss the requirements of Rule 702 and instead 
emphasized how fingerprint evidence has “a long history of admissibility in 
the courts of this country” and credited the expert community’s claim that 
there was an “essentially zero” error rate in the field.73 
Thus, as critics have described, federal courts avoid conducting any 
substantive discussion of the reliability language in Rule 702.  Instead, the 
analysis resembles a cursory Frye analysis rather than a Daubert analysis or 
the analysis actually required by Rule 702. 
II.  EXPERT RELIABILITY IN STATE COURTS 
We conducted a study to assess whether state courts have engaged more 
meaningfully with the reliability requirements in Rule 702 in criminal cases 
since many states have adopted the language of the 2000 revisions of Rule 
702.  As this Part describes, the federal appellate rulings concerning 
fingerprint evidence mirror the entire body of state court rulings that 
commonly do not discuss Rule 702 at all, much less its reliability language, 
and discuss reliability if at all only in a very general way, without engaging 
with the specific requirements of Rule 702.  While state courts do at times 
cite to the language of Rule 702, they often at most then recite Daubert 
factors regarding reliability without explaining what reliability means and 
without demanding that experts demonstrate any type of reliability as 
prescribed by the Rule.  The courts instead largely rely on other judicial 
opinions that have previously admitted the form of evidence, state that the 
qualifications or expertise of the expert suffice as a proxy for reliability, or 
find that defendants have not adequately preserved objections to reliability.  
It is incredibly rare to find any discussion of reliability, except in one context:  
when courts exclude defense experts. 
A.  Overview of Study Findings 
We examine how state courts have used the reliability prongs of Rule 702 
in criminal cases in the states that have adopted some version of the federal 
Rule 702 or an equivalent with language regarding the reliability of the 
 
 70. Id. at 238, 240–41. 
 71. Id. at 244. 
 72. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 269, 271. 
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proffered expert evidence.  Those states, and the year that they adopted Rule 
702 or an analogue that contains a reliability rule, are indicated in Appendix 
II.74  Importantly, we could only examine published and nonsummary written 
judicial decisions; thus, these data consisted entirely of appellate rulings.  
Appellate rulings with non-summary decisions and on evidentiary questions 
are not common in state courts.  Moreover, we only examined decisions that 
cited to Rule 702, and not rulings failing entirely to cite to the Rule. 
For those reasons, the data cannot provide the full picture conveying what 
state practice looks like.  These data are limited to years in which states 
adopted Rule 702.  For some states, that includes far more years and more 
time for the case law to develop than in others.  We excluded cases not 
applying the post-2000 version of Rule 702, except in states that had included 
reliability-related language in their rule pre-2000.  We examined criminal 
rulings—not rulings on other constitutional or evidentiary claims.  As a 
result, we excluded cases that did not discuss reliability in any way but rather 
relied on whether the expert testimony was relevant to disputed issues in the 
case75 or whether the expert was properly qualified with sufficient education, 
training, and experience.76  These searches were limited to state court rulings 
in criminal cases since our focus is on forensic evidence.  Rulings that quoted 
the language from the state rule 702 but did not say anything about that 
language were not included.  We were looking for cases that said something 
in their reasoning about the reliability requirements in Rule 702, even if it 
was a summary statement that the expert evidence in question was reliable. 
We identified over 850 cases that quoted either of the two Rule 702 
reliability standards in their text or that were cited as discussing Rule 702’s 
gatekeeping requirement.  From those, we identified 229 cases that discussed 
one of the two standards, including language concerning “reliable principles 
and methods” and reliable application to the facts of the case.  Appendix I 
includes citations to each of those cases.  We included rulings that, in 
interpreting state rule 702 reliability requirements, applied the federal 
Daubert standard.  We did not include rulings that did not quote from state 
rule 702 requirements.  Nor did we include cases that applied Daubert but 
not the state rule 702.77  To identify these cases, we conducted searches for 
cases quoting the language from the relevant state rule 702 and KeyCite 
searches.  We had assistance from a research assistant and pro bono 
 
 74. See infra Appendix II.  The following states have either not adopted an analogue to 
Rule 702 or do not have rules of evidence:  Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 75. See, e.g., People v. Stafford, No. 332007, 2017 WL 3642652, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 24, 2017). 
 76. While we excluded cases that relied on whether a person was properly qualified as an 
expert, instead of applying a reliability standard, see generally State v. Farris, 210 So. 3d 877 
(La. Ct. App. 2016); Gray v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2016), we included cases 
in which the court stated that the expert testimony was reliable, and, in explaining the reason 
why, simply referred to the expert’s training and experience, see People v. Lay, No. 330880, 
2017 WL 3276845 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017). 
 77. See generally State v. Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 2015). 
2018] THE MYTH OF THE RELIABILITY TEST 1573 
associates at two law firms, all of whom conducted duplicative searches in 
an effort to locate any cases that the others might have missed.  While it is 
certainly possible that we have still omitted cases, we hope that with so many 
people assisting in reviewing these state court rulings that we have a good 
collection of the rulings that exist on state expert-reliability standards.  
Appendix II lists the number of these cases with a nonsummary discussion 
of state rule 702 reliability elements.   
The rulings were not concentrated in any set of forensic disciplines but 
reflected a wide variety of disciplines and types of proffered expertise.78  For 
example, the cases involved disciplines ranging from blood alcohol testing 
(thirteen cases) to ballistics (seven cases), fingerprint comparisons (six cases) 
to different forms of drug testing (seventeen cases), modern DNA testing 
(sixteen cases) to firearms analysis (eight cases), and evidence concerning 
false confessions (six cases) and eyewitness memory (six cases).  A larger 
grouping of fifty-three cases includes psychological testimony, which ranges 
from syndrome evidence, child-abuse evidence, forensic interviewing, and 
false-confession-related evidence.  Those contain very different disciplines, 
but it is noteworthy that within those cases, the defense was excluded six of 
eleven times that the evidence was proffered in these cases.  The prosecution 
expert was excluded in only one case.  As discussed below, such exclusions 
are unlikely to be appealed, but they may also be far less likely to occur. 
B.  State Rule 702 Rulings 
We then analyzed the content of these state court rulings that discussed the 
reliability language in the relevant expert-admissibility rule.  Much of the 
legal reasoning in these opinions was brief and largely superficial in nature.  
Many state courts hold that it is unnecessary to conduct a Rule 702 analysis 
if the forensics are not novel, which is typically a component of a Frye 
analysis, not a Rule 702 inquiry.  For example, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
of Oklahoma ruled in a shaken baby syndrome case that a trial court “has 
discretion to avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings in ordinary cases 
where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted, in 
order to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay.”79  Many state courts did not 
analyze the language of their rule in any detail but instead conducted a 
Daubert analysis.  Of the 229 rulings identified, 104 relied at least in part on 
a Daubert analysis.  Forty of the rulings stated that expert evidence satisfied 
Rule 702 or Daubert because prior rulings had already approved of such 
evidence.80  Many decisions quoted the text of their rule but did not do more 
than summarily state that the relevant expert testimony was reliable; we 
included such decisions in our analysis.81 
 
 78. See infra Appendix I. 
 79. Day v. State, 303 P.3d 291, 295 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013). 
 80. See, e.g., State v. Frye, No. COA16–362, 2016 WL 6440555, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Nov. 1, 2016). 
 81. See, e.g., Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016). 
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For example, we located only five rulings in Louisiana discussing 
reliability in the context of Louisiana’s analogue to Rule 702, adopted in 
2014.  The first of those cases merely noted that reliability is a threshold 
determination and then emphasized the “broad latitude” that judges have 
when making reliability determinations.82  It then proceeded to recount the 
credentials of the prosecution experts.83 
The second such ruling repeated verbatim the same boilerplate language 
concerning judges’ “broad latitude.”84  However, it then discussed the 
defendant’s motion challenging admissibility of firearms testimony.85  The 
motion, the court noted, cited to a National Research Council (NRC) report86 
and the lengthy hearing that the trial judge had conducted, during which the 
defense questioned the expert about his proficiency and about the reliability 
of the method.87  The court discussed concerns that expert credentials and 
experience are not sufficient.88  However, the court cited prior rulings in 
Louisiana, all predating the adoption of the new Rule 702 analogue, and 
concluded that “according to the jurisprudence of this State, testimony 
regarding the witness’s background, qualifications, training, and 
experience . . . supports the trial court’s ruling that [the analyst’s] testimony 
was reliable per Daubert.”89  The court discussed evidence regarding error 
rates and discussed federal rulings on similar evidence before concluding that 
“even after publication of the [NRC] Report, courts have addressed, in detail, 
the reliability of such testimony and ruled it admissible, although to varying 
degrees of specificity.”90 
A third opinion relied upon factors in Daubert, instead of the text of the 
Rule 702 analogue, for its analysis.91  There, an appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s ruling by similarly citing to the expert’s credentials and 
experience in pediatric medicine.92  The fourth opinion concerned DNA 
testing, which is statutorily admissible in Louisiana.93  The court 
acknowledged, however, that new advances in methods of using DNA may 
raise reliability concerns, emphasized the importance of the trial judge’s 
gatekeeping function concerning reliability, and remanded with an order that 
the trial judge conduct a reliability hearing.94  The fifth and final opinion, in 
 
 82. State v. Cogar, No. 2017 KA 0426, 2017 WL 4082432, at *10–11 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 
15, 2017) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266, 1271 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 85. Id. at 1272. 
 86. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7. 
 87. Lee, 217 So. 3d at 1272–75. 
 88. Id. at 1272–73. 
 89. Id. at 1276. 
 90. Id. at 1278. 
 91. State v. Haley, 222 So. 3d 153, 164–66 (La. Ct. App. 2017).  While such a 
technique, involving subjective experience-based judgments, may not have error-rate data 
for the entire method, any such expert can be proficiency tested. See generally Garrett & 
Mitchell, supra note 49. 
 92. Haley, 222 So. 3d at 164–66. 
 93. State v. Hampton, 183 So. 3d 769, 774, 779 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (citing LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:441.1 (1989)). 
 94. Id. at 776–79. 
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2014, found that IQ-test expert testimony was admissible because such 
testimony was based on reliable principles and methods.95  Thus, none of the 
above rulings denied admissibility.  Only two of the five cases engaged in 
any detailed discussion of the evidence concerning reliability of the method 
proffered. 
Written judicial rulings in favor of the defense were rare.  We located 
sixteen cases that reversed and found that the trial court erred in admitting 
proffered prosecution expert evidence.  Only three cases remanded for 
additional consideration of admissibility.  A Delaware ruling reversed 
admissibility in a drug-testing case involving a field test to identify 
marijuana.96  Two Indiana cases upheld the admission of expert testimony 
related to marijuana.  One found harmless error where the trial court admitted 
the prosecution expert’s in-court identification of actual marijuana,97 while 
the other found harmless error where the trial court excluded the defendant’s 
evidence of a negative urinalysis.98  A Massachusetts case involving canine 
narcotics-scent identification found the dog’s evidence inadmissible as expert 
evidence.99 
Several Michigan cases are also instructive.  The court in one Michigan 
case found that an expert interpreting homicide scene evidence should have 
been excluded but that any error was harmless.100  Without assessing the 
actual reliability of the expert, a second Michigan ruling found harmless error 
as to expert testimony on the psychology of substance abuse.101  After the 
Michigan Supreme Court vacated and remanded that ruling for further 
review,102 the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the expert should have 
been excluded but that the error was not outcome determinative and, 
therefore, constituted harmless error.103  A third case from Michigan 
excluded the prosecution’s expert testimony regarding linguistic analysis.104 
A Mississippi case ruled that a prosecution witness, who would have 
presented shooting-distance and trajectory measurements, should have been 
excluded.105  A second Mississippi ruling rejected proffered testimony from 
 
 95. State v. Mullins, No. 14-260, 2014 WL 4926162, at *2 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014).  
An additional ruling quoted from the state’s rule 702 but did not make any statement 
concerning the reliability of the expert, although it noted the expert’s qualifications. See State 
v. Farris, 210 So. 3d 877, 892 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
 96. State v. Lucas, No. Cr.A. No.1503008254, 2015 WL 5157030, at *3–4 (Del. Ct. Com. 
Pl. Sept. 2, 2015). 
 97. Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
 98. Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
 99. Commonwealth v. Corniel, No. 2004-0571, 2005 WL 1668448, at *8 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. June 23, 2005). 
 100. People v. Dixon-Bey, No. 331499, 2017 WL 4272135, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
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 103. People v. Hamilton, No. 319980, 2017 WL 3316958, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 
2017). 
 104. People v. Spitler, No. 331962, 2017 WL 2664729, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20, 
2017). 
 105. Parvin v. State, 113 So. 3d 1243, 1252 (Miss. 2013). 
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a coroner who would have testified that the victim was in a “guarded 
position” when killed.106  A North Carolina court found that the trial court 
abused its discretion by admitting blood-alcohol testing evidence due to its 
lack of reliability.107 
Three additional cases involved remands on appeal.  A Louisiana case 
regarding DNA evidence, as noted above, was remanded due to concerns 
about the age of the samples and the procedures used.108  A West Virginia 
ruling that predated its current Rule 702 analogue was remanded not for 
reasons related to the admissibility of the testimony but rather to judicial 
instructions bolstering the expert evidence.109  An Arizona case was similarly 
remanded for additional inquiry into whether gas chromatography evidence 
had been reliability applied to the facts of the case.110 
Many of the cases that found prosecution expert evidence to be admissible 
emphasized prior precedent as the reason for doing so; of the 229 cases, 41 
chiefly relied on precedent in their reasoning.111  For example, an Arizona 
appellate court emphasized that “our supreme court has sustained convictions 
based solely on expert testimony about fingerprint or palm print evidence 
because the evidence is sufficiently reliable.”112 
As noted, we did not include in this analysis rulings that were more cursory 
and that did not discuss reliability in any way.  Many decisions did not even 
mention reliability but simply cited to prior precedent.  Some rulings quoted 
to the state rule 702 but did not discuss reliability or the text of the rule.  For 
example, a Michigan case quoted to the state rule 702 and noted that the 
police officer had used a “widely accepted” marijuana test, but the court 
could not support the claim that the test was in fact widely accepted, explain 
how it worked, or provide evidence of its accuracy.113  Without speaking to 
reliability, the court said that the defendant did not do enough to affirmatively 
challenge the evidence and dismissed the claim.114  Still other rulings did not 
quote the state rule 702 but rather described reliability in a cursory way 
without addressing that language.  A Wisconsin court did just that when it 
ruled on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim instead of a direct 
evidentiary challenge.115  There, the court briefly noted that the trial court 
conducted a Daubert hearing under the state evidentiary rule but without 
quoting the language of that rule or discussing reliability under Daubert.116  
The court stated that the fingerprint analyst in question had performed 
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305965, 2012 WL 5290309, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 112. State v. Favela, 323 P.3d 716, 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 
 113. People v. Creager, No. 264417, 2007 WL 624529, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2007). 
 114. Id. 
 115. State v. Khalid, No. 2014AP251–CRNM, 2014AP252-CRNM, 2014 WL 12666820, 
at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2014). 
 116. Id. 
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thousands of comparisons, had four years of training, and was certified, so 
there was “no arguable basis for challenging the scientific validity of the 
fingerprint analysis.”117  We did not include the opinion because it did not 
quote or rely on a Rule 702 analogue. 
Other courts emphasized that issues of reliability should be addressed at 
trial through cross-examination, and not by judges assessing whether expert 
evidence is minimally reliable.118  In doing so, they failed to conduct either 
Rule 702 reliability assessments or more general Rule 403 assessments; they 
instead adopted a laissez-faire approach toward the reliability of expert 
evidence. 
In addition to cases that discuss the qualifications of an expert but do not 
discuss reliability, which we did not include, there were additional rulings 
which did discuss reliability but concluded that the expert was reliable simply 
because of the person’s background and experience.  For example, a 
Michigan court stated that an officer could testify about drug trafficking 
operations because his “experience in investigating drug trafficking 
operations” in that county was in itself “sufficient to establish the reliability 
requirement.”119  Another case described the process followed by an expert 
who showed the jurors images that he relied on and explained what 
observations he made.120  The court then stated, in a cursory way, that this 
process was itself sufficient to show reliable principles and methods—
leaving out any discussion of whether those principles and methods were in 
fact reliable.121 
In contrast, in a telling discussion, the Delaware Supreme Court 
disregarded the lack of documentation in a firearms case.122  While the court 
noted that it would have been better if the expert had been able to recall how 
conclusions regarding ballistics had been reached in the case, the court still 
found the evidence reliable citing the state rule 702 and the expert’s 
qualification.123  The court also noting that in, cross-examination, the 
defendant was “able to expose [the analyst’s] lack of recollection about the 
application of the methodology to the facts here.”124 
C.  Defense Experts 
Some state appellate decisions affirm the exclusion of expert evidence that 
the defense sought to introduce.  Critics have long complained that a different 
standard applies when defendants, as opposed to prosecutors, seek to 
introduce expert evidence.  We observed more detailed discussions of 
proffered defense expert evidence, and many of the small set of rulings 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1050–51 (Ind. 2011). 
 119. People v. Dado, No. 266962, 2007 WL 778489, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2007). 
 120. People v. Spencer, No. 271844, 2007 WL 4125378, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
2007). 
 121. Id. 
 122. McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364, 369 (Del. 2009). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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affirming exclusion of expert evidence were in that context.  We note again 
that excluding defense experts would be far more likely to result in an appeal.  
While prosecutors may rarely have experts excluded, we cannot say so based 
on the observed appellate opinions. 
There were thirty-four such cases in our set that involved the trial exclusion 
of defense expert evidence.  An Arizona case excluded a defense expert 
regarding causation of the victim’s injuries—largely on grounds of 
qualification—but noted the lack of reliable data or methodology.125  One 
Indiana case affirmed exclusion of a defense expert regarding a voice 
comparison126 and another did so regarding a urinalysis.127  While another 
Indiana case did the same regarding a breathalyzer test result, the court in that 
instance declined to publish the opinion.128  A Kansas case affirmed the 
exclusion of the testimony of a defendant’s breathalyzer expert.129  A 
Massachusetts case affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s DNA expert,130 
another affirmed the exclusion of a defense expert on false confessions,131 
and a third related to a defense psychologist.132  Two Michigan cases 
affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s testimony regarding the sources for 
false confessions.133  Other rulings from Michigan include those related to 
child sexual-abuse expertise,134 sex offender profiling,135 battered-woman-
defense-related testimony,136 eyewitness identification expert evidence,137 
evidence on analyzing hair for drugs,138 and a defendant’s ballistics 
evidence.139  In Mississippi, cases affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s 
eyewitness identification expert,140 the exclusion of a defendant’s false 
confessions expert,141 the exclusion of a defendant’s crime-scene 
 
 125. State v. Johnson, No. S1100 CR-201201686, 2013 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 401, at *3–5 
(Dec. 17, 2013). 
 126. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 595–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 127. Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143–45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
 128. Kryza v. State, No. 64A05-1305-CR-239, 2014 WL 345734, at *7–8 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Jan. 30, 2014). 
 129. City of Topeka v. Lauck, No. 116,316, 2017 WL 4216191, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 
22, 2017). 
 130. Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 25 N.E.3d 859, 872–73 (Mass. 2015). 
 131. Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843, 863 (Mass. 2014). 
 132. Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495, 515 (Mass. 2016). 
 133. People v. Thames, No. 306313, 2013 WL 5663112, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2013); People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Mich. 2012).  
 134. People v. Piontek, No. 268048, 2007 WL 1227705, at *5–7 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 
2007); People v. Schneider, No. 273421, 2007 WL 1202322, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 
2007). 
 135. People v. Steele, 769 N.W.2d 256, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Dobek, 732 
N.W.2d 546, 570–71 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). 
 136. People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985, 2010 WL 3021861, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 3, 2010). 
 137. People v. Buchanan, No. 275660, 2008 WL 681884, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
2008). 
 138. People v. Farrsiar, No. 320376, 2015 WL 2329071, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 14, 
2015). 
 139. People v. Payne, No. 248708, 2005 WL 433538, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005). 
 140. Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 298 (Miss. 2014). 
 141. Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787, 791 (Miss. 2007). 
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reconstruction expert,142 the exclusion of a defendant’s DNA expert,143 the 
exclusion of a defense eyewitness expert,144 and two cases involving the 
exclusion of a proffered defense crime-scene investigations expert.145  Two 
rulings in a North Carolina case affirmed the exclusion of a proffered expert 
relevant to a self-defense claim and use of force.146  An Ohio case affirmed 
the exclusion of a defense psychiatric witness,147 a second the exclusion of a 
defense firearms witness,148 a third the exclusion of a defense witness on fish 
size,149 and a fourth the exclusion of a defense expert chemically analyzing 
soot,150 and a fifth a defense witness on biomechanics.151  A Utah case 
affirmed the exclusion of a defendant’s eyewitness-identification witness.152  
A Vermont case affirmed exclusion of a defendant’s voice-print analysis 
expert.153  A Wisconsin case affirmed exclusion of a defendant’s 
chromatography expert.154 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The sheer paucity of judicial opinions regarding expert evidence in 
criminal cases is a real concern, apart from the quality of the opinions when 
they do occur.  One contributing factor to the lack of judicial rulings engaging 
with the substance of the reliability rule is the deference to trial court rulings 
in this area, the abuse of discretion review adopted by the Supreme Court in 
General Electric, Co. v. Joiner,155 and the similar rules adopted by state 
courts. 
However, our findings regarding the quality of judicial decisions, and in 
particular, the nonuse of the reliability elements of Rule 702, raise yet 
additional reasons for concern.  Few decisions discussed the meaning or 
content of the reliability rules adopted in each jurisdiction.  Even fewer 
rulings discussed the Rule 702(d) prong regarding reliable application of 
 
 142. Grant v. State, 8 So. 3d 213, 218 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
 143. Williams v. State, No. 2016-KA-00634-COA, 2017 WL 3601170, at *8 (Miss. Ct. 
App. Aug. 22, 2017). 
 144. Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, ¶¶ 33–38 (Miss. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 
136 S. Ct. 2157 (2016). 
 145. Powers v. State, 945 So. 2d 386, ¶¶ 11–13 (Miss. 2006) (en banc); Ross v. State, 22 
So. 3d 400, 420–21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). 
 146. State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1, 15 (N.C. 2016); State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361, 
367–370 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2016). 
 147. State v. Ream, No. 1-12-39, 2013 WL 5447606, at *20–22 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 
2013). 
 148. State v. Wegmann, No. 1-06-98, 2008 WL 434981, at *12–13 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 
2008). 
 149. State v. Whites Landing Fisheries, LLC, No. E-16-040, 2017 WL 3981167, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2017). 
 150. State v. Wangler, No. 1-11-18, 2012 WL 5207546, at *14–19 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 
2017). 
 151. State v. Calise, No. 26027, 2012 WL 4897840, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012). 
 152. State v. Guard, 371 P.3d 1, 2–3 (Utah 2015). 
 153. State v. Forty, 989 A.2d 509, 519 (Vt. 2009). 
 154. State v. Garba, No. 2015AP1243-CR, 2016 WL 5794346, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 
2016). 
 155. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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methods and principles to the facts of a case.  We identified 30 of the 229 
rulings that did so. 
Proposals to sharpen the language regarding reliability in Rule 702, or to 
adopt a separate reliability rule for forensic identification evidence, might 
help to address this concern by making the reliability language more salient.  
Such a proposal might be accompanied by Advisory Committee notes that 
highlight the importance of addressing error and reliability of expert methods 
and their application in particular cases.  Our findings highlight how the 
existing reliability language is largely ignored by judges who continue to rely 
on precedent, the credentials and experience of a proffered expert, and other 
traditional factors. 
New research findings, reports from scientific bodies, and changes in the 
law have had little impact on this analysis.  Very few rulings cited to the 2009 
NRC report156 or the 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology.157  One Louisiana ruling did cite the reports but did 
not rely on them.158  Instead, the court based the decision on prior rulings in 
other courts and affirmed the prosecution’s use of firearms testimony.159  A 
Michigan ruling noted the defense’s reliance on the NRC report but 
nonetheless found the relevant DNA testing to be reliable.160  An Ohio case 
cited to the NRC report regarding firearms, but, rather than rely on it, found 
the experts’ methods to be generally accepted.161  Finally, a Utah case noted 
the defense’s citation to the NRC report’s challenge of the reliability of 
fingerprint evidence but found the expert evidence admissible nonetheless.162 
Another approach to improving the consideration of expert reliability is to 
focus on the courtroom and, specifically, to permit careful questioning of 
experts on studies of error rates, the expert’s own proficiency, and reliability 
in application of the method.  Doing so may require far more discovery than 
judges often provide in criminal cases concerning the work that an expert 
actually does in a criminal case.163  Doing so may also require regulation to 
assure that demanding and realistic proficiency testing is actually performed 
in crime laboratories.  One of us has advocated for the use of proficiency 
testing first to assess expert qualification and again at trial to determine and 
demonstrate an expert’s own accuracy.  Such information appears to be 
highly probative to jurors.164 
Scholars and scientific bodies have for years recommended that forensic 
evidence be regulated by a scientific entity at the national level, but no such 
 
 156. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7. 
 157. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 12. 
 158. State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266, 1272 (La. Ct. App. 2017). 
 159. Id. at 1275–76. 
 160. People v. Jackson, No. 313455, 2014 WL 3973378, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 
2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, 870 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 2015). 
 161. State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936, 944–46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 162. State v. Woodard, 330 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
 163. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., Recommendations to the Attorney General Regarding 
Pretrial Discovery, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ 
ncfs/page/file/865011/download [https://perma.cc/G5VH-8LCA]. 
 164. See Garrett & Mitchell, supra note 49, at 42–43. 
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national entity has been created to date, and state- and federal-level efforts to 
improve standards for forensic evidence have been halting.165  To the extent, 
then, that the problem rests on the shoulders of judges, chiefly state judges, 
far more must be done to introduce reliability into the reliability test that 
judges ostensibly apply to review expert testimony in criminal cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Reliability should be central to the task of judicial examination of expert 
evidence before trial and it should inform how expert evidence is litigated 
and presented during trial.  The modern Rule 702 was drafted to emphasize 
the concept of reliability both as to methods used by experts and their 
application to the facts of a case.  The concept of reliability is particularly 
important in the expert-evidence context because expert testimony may be 
given great weight by jurors and because experts can form opinions and reach 
conclusions that lay witnesses cannot. 
District of Columbia Superior Court Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. explains, 
“Foundational validity for forensic science requires reliability.  It must be 
based on empirical studies, repeatable, reproducible, and accurate at 
appropriate levels—a scientific concept intended to correspond to the legal 
requirement in Rule 702(c) of ‘reliable principles and methods.’”166  Despite 
the centrality of reliability to the use of expert evidence, as we describe, state 
and federal courts have largely avoided the subject of reliability in criminal 
cases.  The reliability test adopted in Rule 702 appears, at least in written 
appellate opinions, to be rarely used in practice to test reliability and, when 
used, it tends to exclude defense witnesses. 
The clear language of the modern Rule 702 calls for a twin analysis of 
expert reliability, but we observed an entrenched judicial unwillingness to 
review expert evidence at all in criminal cases, much less to assess reliability 
and restrict expert testimony that is unreliable.  Errors, including wrongful 
convictions, predictably result from this lax attitude toward judicial 
gatekeeping.  Several types of judicial interventions as well as regulatory 
interventions could improve this state of affairs.  We conclude, however, that 
judges in most states already have a reliability test that they can and should 
use.  The reliability of judgments in criminal cases, in which life and liberty 
is at stake, depends on the sound judicial use of the reliability test. 
 
 165. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 14–21. 
 166. Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Another Harsh Spotlight on Forensic Sciences, JUDGES’ 
J., Winter 2017, at 36, 37. 
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Appendix I:  Expert Reliability Rulings 
 Case Citation Ruling Evidence Type 
Δ or Π 
Expert 
AL 
Payne v. State, CR-15-0225, 2017 WL 
543151 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2017) 
Admit Medical examination Π 
AZ 
State v. Bernstein, 317 P.3d 630 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2014), vacated in part, 349 P.3d 






State v. Brown, No. 2 CA-CR 2015-
0154, 2016 WL 4256875 (Ariz. Ct. App. 






State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 312 P.3d 123 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
AZ 
State v. Chacon, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-
0150, 2015 WL 3536584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
May 28, 2015) 
Admit Drugs Π 
AZ 
State v. Clary, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0694, 








State v. Democker, No. 1 CA-CR 14-
0137, 2016 WL 5899733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Oct. 11, 2016) 
Admit 




State v. Favela, 323 P.3d 716 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2014) 
Admit Fingerprint Π 
AZ 




imaging, firearms  
Π 
AZ 
State v. Foshee, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0249, 







State v. Harold, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-
0316, 2014 WL 632280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 






State v. Johnson, No. S1100 CR-
201201686, 2013 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 
401 (Dec. 17, 2013) 
Exclude Causation Δ 
AZ 
State v. Moore, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0589, 
2017 WL 56267 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 
2017) 
Admit Sexual assault victim Π 
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AZ 
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 321 






State v. Romero, 365 P.3d 358 (Ariz. 
2016) 
Admit Firearms Π 
AZ 
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 304 P.3d 543 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 325 P.3d 
996 (Ariz. 2014) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
AZ 
State v. Saunders, No. 1 CA-CR 15-
0416, 2016 WL 3264105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 






State v. Stephen, No. CR-2009-4604-
001, 2012 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 871 (Feb. 
1, 2012) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
DE 
State v. Cooke, 914 A.2d 1078 (Del. 












State v. Lucas, No. Cr.A. No. 
1503008254, 2015 WL 5157030 (Del. 
Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 2, 2015) 
Exclude Drug identification Π 
DE 
McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364 (Del. 
2009) 
Admit Firearms Π 
DE 
State v. Salasky, 2013 WL 5487363 (Del. 






Andrews v. State, 181 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) 
Admit Psychiatry Π 
IN 
Alcantar v. State, 70 N.E.3d 353 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2016) 
Admit DNA Π 
IN 
Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2014) 
Exclude Urinalysis Δ 
IN 
Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2010) 
Admit Fingerprint Π 
IN 
Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004) 
Admit Fingerprint Π 
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IN 
Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 
2009) 
Admit Blood spatter Π 
IN 
Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. 
2002) 
Admit Bite mark Π 
IN 
Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2012) 
Exclude THC Π 
IN 
Evans v. State, No. 79A04-1308-CR-
386, 2014 WL 1775728 (Ind. Ct. App. 






Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2002) 
Exclude Voice analysis Δ 
IN 
Kryza v. State, No. 64A05-1305-CR-
239, 2014 WL 345734 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Jan. 30, 2014) 
Exclude Breathalyzer Δ 
IN 
Lee v. State, No. 71A03-1301-CR-5, 
2013 WL 2718079 (Ind. Ct. App. June 
12, 2013) 
Admit Causation Π 
IN 








Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000) 
Admit DNA  Π 
IN 
Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004) 
Admit Causation Π 
IN 
Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. 
2002) 
Admit DNA  Π 
IN 
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. 
2011) 
Admit Firearms, toolmark Π 
IN 
Sciaraffa v. State, 28 N.E.3d 351 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2015) 
Admit Drugs Π 
IN 
West v. State, 805 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2004) 
Exclude Fire extinguisher Π 
KS 
City of Topeka v. Lauck, No. 116,316, 
2017 WL 4216191 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 
22, 2017) 
Exclude Breathalyzer Δ 
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KY 
Epperson v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.3d 
157 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014) 
Admit Toxicology Π 
KY 
Futrell v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 
258 (Ky. 2015) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
KY 
Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 525 
S.W.3d 73 (Ky. 2017) 
Admit 




State v. Cogar, No. 2017 KA 0426, 2017 
WL 4082432 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 
2017) 
Admit Medical examination Π 
LA 








State v. Hampton, 183 So. 3d 769 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015) 
Remand DNA Π 
LA 
State v. Lee, 217 So. 3d 1266 (La. Ct. 
App. 2017) 
Admit Ballistics Π 
LA 
State v. Mullins, No. 14-260, 2014 WL 
4926162 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014) 
Admit IQ test Π 
MA 
Commonwealth v. Corniel, No. 2004-
0571, 2005 WL 1668448 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. June 23, 2005) 
Exclude Drug odor (cocaine) Π 
MA 
Commonwealth v. DiCicco, 25 N.E.3d 
859 (Mass. 2015) 
Exclude DNA analysis Δ 
MA 
Commonwealth v. Hoose, 5 N.E.3d 843 
(Mass. 2014) 
Exclude False confessions Δ 
MA 
Commonwealth v. Meeks, Nos. 2002-
10961, 2003-10575, 2006 WL 2819423 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006) 
Admit Ballistics Π 
MA 
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 919 N.E.2d 






MA Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 
495 (Mass. 2016) Exclude* Psychology Δ 
MD 




effect of brain tumor 
Δ 
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MI 
People v. Altman, No. 267592, 2007 WL 
2609448 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Causation Π 
MI 
People v. Anderson, No. 331466, 2017 
WL 4699734 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 
2017) (per curiam) 
Exclude Cell phone  Π 
MI 
People v. Bailey, No. 285638, 2009 WL 
3323252 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2009) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Sexual abuse Π 
MI 
People v. Barnard, No. 265068, 2007 
WL 1159977 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 
2007) (per curiam) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MI 
People v. Bowne, No. 316283, 2014 WL 
5364076 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Child sexual abuse Π 
MI 
People v. Brown, No. 325115, 2016 WL 
555928 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2016) 
(per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Brown, No. 323887, 2016 WL 
2731069 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2016) 
(per curiam) 
Admit 





People v. Buchanan, No. 275660, 2008 
WL 681884 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 






People v. Burns, No. 327179, 2016 WL 
6495853 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016) 
(per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Caldwell, No. 318915, 2015 
WL 558322 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 
2015) (per curiam) 
Admit 
Delayed disclosures 
in child abuse 
Π 
MI 
People v. Carpenter, No. 302231, 2012 
WL 933615 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 
2012) (per curiam) 
Admit Domestic abuse Π 
MI 
People v. Carter, No. 318511, 2015 WL 
302693 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2015) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Fire causation Π 
MI 
People v. Ceasor, No. 268150, 2007 WL 







People v. Dado, No. 266962, 2007 WL 







People v. Daniel, Nos. 308230, 308231, 
308575, 2014 WL 3844010 (Mich. Ct. 
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MI 
People v. Dixon-Bey, No. 331499, 2017 







People v. Dobek, 732 N.W.2d 546 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007) 
Exclude 
Psychological 




People v. Farraj, No. 264235, 2007 WL 
861100 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2007) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Causation Π 
MI 
People v. Fathi, No. 288330, 2010 WL 
2836275 (Mich. Ct. App. July 20, 2010) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Sexual abuse Π 
MI 
People v. Farrsiar, No. 320376, 2015 WL 
2329071 (Mich. Ct. App. May 14, 2015) 
(per curiam) 
Exclude Hair drug testing Δ 
MI 
People v. Fawaz, No. 264703, 2007 WL 
861104 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2007) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Blood spatter Π 
MI 
People v. Garten, No. 323670, 2016 WL 
555834 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2016) 
(per curiam), perm. app. denied, 886 
N.W.2d 433 (Mich. 2016) 
Admit 




People v. Graham, No. 263702, 2007 
WL 861173 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 
2007) (per curiam) 
Admit Handwriting Π 
MI 
People v. Hamilton, No. 319980, 2017 
WL 3316958 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 
2017) (per curiam) 
Exclude 
Psychology of 




People v. Hammock, No. 277672, 2008 
WL 4330176 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 
2008) (per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Harvey, Nos. 319482, 319483, 
2015 WL 8953522 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 
15, 2015) (per curiam) 
Admit Surveillance footage Π 
MI 
People v. Hill, No. 326550, 2016 WL 
3365256 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2016) 
(per curiam), perm. app. denied, 887 
N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 2016) 
Admit 




People v. Jackson, No. 313455, 2014 WL 
3973378 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2014) 
(per curiam), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 870 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 2015) 
Admit DNA  Π 
MI 
People v. James, No. 301526, 2012 WL 
75355 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Causation Π 
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MI 
People v. Johnson, No. 324567, 2016 
WL 2342284 (Mich. Ct. App. May 3, 
2016) (per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Kircher, No. 275215, 2008 WL 
3540254 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2008) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Raw sewage hazards Π 
MI 
People v. Kowalski, 821 N.W.2d 14 
(Mich. 2012) 
Exclude False confessions Δ 
MI Id. Remand Clinical psychology Δ 
MI 
People v. Lawson, No. 302128, 2012 WL 




on ear characteristics 
Π 
MI 
People v. Lane, 862 N.W.2d 446 (Mich. 






People v. Lay, No. 330880, 2017 WL 
3276845 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017) 
(per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. McDaniel, No. 290689, 2010 
WL 3813347 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 






People v. Payne, No. 248708, 2005 WL 
433538 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005) 
(per curiam) 
Exclude Firearms Δ 
MI 
People v. Perrien, Nos. 312743, 317405, 
2015 WL 7283216 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 
17, 2015) (per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Piontek, No. 268048, 2007 WL 
1227705 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2007) 
(per curiam) 
Exclude Child sexual abuse Δ 
MI 
People v. Pritchett, No. 329901, 2017 
WL 1422830 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 
2017) (per curiam), perm. app. denied, 
903 N.W.2d 581 (Mich. 2017) 
Admit Ballistics Π 
MI 
People v. Pruitt, No. 313065, 2014 WL 
1320253 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2014) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Fire causation Π 
MI 
People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985, 
2010 WL 3021861 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 






People v. Schneider, No. 273421, 2007 
WL 1202322 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 
2007) (per curiam) 
Exclude 
Profile of a child 
molester 
Δ 
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MI 
People v. Spencer, No. 271844, 2007 
WL 4125378 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
2007) (per curiam) 
Admit Fire causation Π 
MI 
People v. Spitler, No. 331962, 2017 WL 
2664729 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20, 2017) 
(per curiam), remanded on other 
grounds, No. 156281, 2018 WL 561367 
(Mich. 2018) 
Exclude Linguistic analysis Π 
MI 
People v. Steele, 769 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 






People v. Stiehl, No. 283641, 2009 WL 
2951284 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) 
(per curiam) 
Admit Toxicology Π 
MI 
People v. Stroud, Nos. 322812, 322879 
2016 WL 901333 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 
8, 2016) (per curiam), perm. app. denied, 






People v. Stumpmier, No. 330145, 2017 
WL 1488966 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 
2017) (per curiam), rev’d on other 






People v. Sweeney, No. 330662, 2017 
WL 2562562 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 
2017) (per curiam) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
MI 
People v. Sutton, No. 275447, 2008 WL 







People v. Thames, No. 306313, 2013 WL 







People v. Thomas, No. 326645, 2016 
WL 3421403 (Mich. Ct. App. June 21, 
2016) (per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Traxler, No. 314951, 2014 WL 







People v. Unger, 749 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008) 
Admit Medical examination Π 
MI 
People v. West, No. 317109, 2014 WL 
7157390 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2014) 
(per curiam) 
Admit 




People v. Wood, 862 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2014), vacated in part on other 
grounds, 871 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 2015) 
Admit DNA Π 
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MI 
People v. Wright, No. 261380, 2006 WL 







People v. Wyngarden, No. 321736, 2015 
WL 4746277 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 







Anderson v. State, 62 So. 3d 927 (Miss. 
2011) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 
Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616 (Miss. 
2013) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 
Brown v. State, 33 So. 3d 1134 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2009) 
Admit Forensic pathology Π 
MS 
Carter v. State, 996 So. 2d 112 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2008) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 







Daniels v. State, No. 2016-KA-00501-
COA, 2017 WL 3485858 (Miss. Ct. App. 
Aug. 15, 2017) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 
Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 
2007) 
Exclude False confessions Δ  
MS Id. Exclude Forensic pathology Π 
MS 







Flaggs v. State, 999 So. 2d 393 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2008) 
Admit Blood spatter Π 
MS 
Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009 (Miss. 

















Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469 (Miss. 
2010) 
Admit DNA Π 
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MS 
Grant v. State, 8 So. 3d 213 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2008) 
Exclude Evidence gathering Δ 
MS 
Gray v. State, 202 So. 3d 243 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2015) 
Admit 




Howard v. State, 853 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 
2003) 
Admit Bite mark Π 
MS 
Hull v. State, 174 So. 3d 887 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2015) 
Admit Forensic pathology Π 
MS 







Lattimer v. State, 952 So. 2d 206 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2006) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS Lima v. State, 7 So. 3d 903 (Miss. 2009) Admit Forensic pathology Π 
MS 
Lowe v. State, 178 So. 3d 760 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2012), rev’d, 127 So. 3d 178 (Miss. 
2013) 
Admit Computer forensics Π 
MS 
Madden v. State, 97 So. 3d 1217 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2011) 
Admit Child sexual abuse Π 
MS 
McClain v. State, 929 So. 2d 946 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2005) 
Admit Toolmark, footprint Π 
MS 
Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073 (Miss. 
2010) 
Admit Causation Π 
MS 
Mooneyham v. State, 915 So. 2d 1102 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 
Newell v. State, 176 So. 3d 78 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2014) 
Exclude Forensic pathology Π 
MS 
Parvin v. State, 113 So. 3d 1243 (Miss. 
2013) 
Exclude Ballistics Π 
MS 
Pickett v. State, 143 So. 3d 596 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2013) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
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MS 
Powell v. State, NO. 2016-KA-00518-
COA, 2017 WL 3712862 (Miss. Ct. App. 
Aug. 29, 2017) 
Admit Forensic interview Π 
MS 
Powers v. State, 945 So. 2d 386 (Miss. 
2006) (en banc) 
Exclude* Crime scene analysis Δ 
MS 
Ross v. State, 22 So. 3d 400 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2009) 
Admit Pathology Δ 
MS 
State v. Scott, No. 2014-KA-00123-SCT, 
2017 WL 2377563 (Miss. June 1, 2017) 
Admit Psychiatry Δ 
MS 







Taylor v. State, 954 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 
2007) 
Admit Burn patterns Π 
MS 







Warren v. State, 187 So. 3d 616 (Miss. 
2016) 
Admit Drugs Π 
MS 
Williams v. State, No. 2016-KA-00634-
COA, 2017 WL 3601170 (Miss. Ct. App. 
Aug. 22, 2017) 
Exclude DNA Δ 
MS 
Willie v. State, 204 So. 3d 1268 (Miss. 
2016) 
Admit Ballistics Π 
NH State v. Langill, 945 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2008) Exclude Fingerprints Π 
NH 
State v. Staples, No. 2006-0681, 2008 
WL 11258731 (N.H. Jan. 30, 2008) 
Admit Accounting Π 
NC 
State v. Abrams, 789 S.E.2d 863 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2016) 
Admit Drugs Π 
NC 







State v. Daughtridge, 789 S.E.2d 667 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016) 
Exclude Causation Π 
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NC 
State v. Frye, No. COA16-362, 2016 WL 
6440555 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016) 
Admit Drugs Π 
NC 
State v. Greene, No. COA16-1309, 2017 







State v. Hunt, 790 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016) 
Admit Drugs Π 
NC 
State v. McDonald, 716 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2011) 
Admit Drugs Π 
NC 
State v. McGrady, 753 S.E.2d 361 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2014) 
Exclude Use of force Δ 
NC 
State v. McGrady, 787 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 
2016) 
Exclude Reaction times Δ 
NC 
State v. Perry, 750 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2013) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
NC 
State v. Quick, No. COA13-289, 2014 
WL 46996 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2014) 
Admit Drugs Π 
NC 
State v. Shore, 803 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2017) 
Admit Child abuse Π 
NC 
State v. Turbyfill, 776 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 







State v. Younts, 803 S.E.2d 641 (N.C. 






State v. Armstrong, Nos. 2001-T-0120, 
2002-T-0071, 2004 WL 2376467 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2004) 
Admit Ballistics, toolmarks Π 
OH 
State v. Bell, No. 06-MA-189, 2008 WL 
3009858 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25, 2008) 
Admit DNA  Π 
OH 
State v. Blamer, No. 00CA07, 2001 WL 
109130 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001) 
Admit Bite marks Π 
OH 
State v. Calise, No. 26027, 2012 WL 
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OH 
State v. Graham, No. 3052-M, 2001 WL 
22482 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2001) 
Admit  Hair comparison Π 
OH Id. Exclude 




State v. Henderson, No. 13 CR 135, 2017 
WL 462596 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2017)
Admit Medical examination Π 
OH 
State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2013) 
Admit Ballistics Π 
OH 
State v. Marshall, No. 06CA23, 2007 
WL 4180806 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 16, 
2007) 
Admit Fire characteristics Π 
OH 
State v. McDade, Nos. OT-06-001, OT-
06-004, 2007 WL 549498 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Feb. 23, 2007) 
Admit Drugs Π 
OH 
State v. Mills, No. 2007 AP 07 0039, 
2009 WL 1041441 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 
15, 2009) 
Admit Forensic pathology Π 
OH 
State v. Mobarak, No. 14AP-517, 2017 














State v. Onunwor, No. 93937, 2010 WL 
4684717 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010) 
Admit Firearms Π 
OH 
State v. Plott, 80 N.E.3d 1108 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2017) 
Admit Forensic pathology Π 
OH 
State v. Ream, No. 1-12-39, 2013 WL 
5447606 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013) 
Exclude Psychiatry Δ 
OH 
State v. Shalash, 41 N.E.3d 1263 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2015) 
Admit Drug analogues Π 
OH 
State v. Sharma, 875 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. 2007) 
Admit Polygraph Δ 
OH 
State v. Thompson, No. 89391, 2008 WL 
248767 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2008) 
Admit Fire causation Π 
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OH 
State v. Wangler, No. 1-11-18, 2012 WL 
5207546 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2012) 
Admit 
Chemical analysis of 
soot 
Π  
OH Id. Exclude 




State v. Wegmann, No. 1-06-98, 2008 
WL 434981 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 
2008) 
Exclude Bullet wound Δ 
OH 
State v. Whites Landing Fisheries, LLC, 
No. E-16-040, 2017 WL 3981167 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2017) 
Exclude Fish shrinkage Δ 
OH 
State v. Williams, 703 N.E.2d 1284 






Bosse v. State, 400 P.3d 834 (Crim. App. 
Okla. 2017), aff’d, 406 P.3d 26 (Crim. 
App. Okla. 2017) 
Admit Fire reconstruction Π 
OK 
Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906 (Crim. 













State v. Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 
2015) 
Admit Child sexual abuse Π 
SD 





















State v. Griffin, 384 P.3d 186 (Utah 
2016) 
Admit DNA Π 





State v. Jones, 345 P.3d 1195 (Utah 
2015) 
Admit DNA Π 
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UT 
State v. Lievanos, 298 P.3d 662 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2013) 
Admit DNA Π 
UT 
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 
2012) 
Admit DNA, fingerprints Π 
UT State v. Perea, 322 P.3d 624 (Utah 2013) Admit False confessions Δ 
UT 
State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226 (Utah 
2015) 
Admit Computer forensics Π 
UT 
State v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2012) 
Admit Palm print Π 
UT Id. Remand Palm print Δ 
UT 
State v. Shepherd, 357 P.3d 598 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2015) 
Admit Boat operation Π 
UT 
State v. Turner, 283 P.3d 527 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2012) 
Admit Breathalyzer Π 
UT 
State v. Woodard, 330 P.3d 1283 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2014) 
Admit Fingerprints Π 
VT 
State v. Abair, No. 2011-089, 2012 WL 












VT State v. Forty, 989 A.2d 509 (Vt. 2009) Exclude Voice identification Δ 
VT State v. Pratt, 128 A.3d 883 (Vt. 2015) Admit 
Forensic cell phone 
analysis 
Π 















*  The court held that the expert testimony should have been excluded but that the defendant’s 
attorney’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  
VT State v. Tester, 968 A.2d 895 (Vt. 2009) Admit DNA Π 
WV 
State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 
2002) 
Admit 




State v. Wakefield, 781 S.E.2d 222 (W. 
Va. 2015) 
Admit Drugs Π 
WI 
State v. Alvarez, No. 2014AP753-CR, 
2015 WL 158899 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 






State v. Chitwood, 879 N.W.2d 786 






State v. Chough, No. 2016AP406-CR, 







State v. Evans, No. 2015AP2315-CR, 
2016 WL 5922863 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
12, 2016) 
Admit Drug quantities Π 
WI 
State v. Garba, No. 2015AP1243-CR, 














State v. Johnson, No. 2013AP65-CR, 
2013 WL 12185148 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
11, 2013) 
Admit Sexual assault Π 
WI 
State v. Smith, 874 N.W.2d 610 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2015) 
Admit Child sexual assault Π 
WI 
State v. Spizzirri, No. 2015AP84-CR, 
2015 WL 9309202 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 






State v. VanMeter, No. 2014AP1852-
CR, 2015 WL 7432604 (Wis. Ct. App. 






State v. Zamora, No. 2016AP1923-CR, 
2017 WL 4317783 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 
27, 2017) 
Admit Sexual assault Π 
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Appendix II:  State Rule 702 Adoption 
and Usage in Criminal Cases 
State Year Adopted Cases Discussing Reliability 
Alabama167 2012 1 
Arizona 2012 17 
Delaware 2001 4 
Florida 2013 1 
Georgia 2013 0 
Indiana168 1994 18 
Kansas 2014 1 
Kentucky 2007 3 
Louisiana 2014 5 
Massachusetts169 n/a 6 
Maryland 1993 1 
Michigan 2004 59 
Mississippi 2003 37 
Missouri 2017 0 
New Hampshire 2016 2 
North Carolina 2011 14 
Ohio170 1994 22 
 
 167. The Alabama rule has the same reliability language but a slightly different structure 
(as well as additional provisions regarding juvenile cases, medical testimony, and use of DNA 
evidence). ALA. R. EVID. 702.  Regarding expert evidence generally, the rule states: 
(b) In addition to the requirements in section (a), expert testimony based on a 
scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if: 
(1) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
Id. 
 168. IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (requiring that the expert testimony “rests upon reliable scientific 
principles”).  The Rule included a reliability prong upon its adoption in 1994.  A 2014 revision 
edited the structure, but the text of the reliability prong remained the same. 
 169. Massachusetts does not have official rules of evidence, but the Supreme Judicial Court 
recommends the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Press Release, Mass.gov, 2017 Edition of 
the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence Now Available (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.mass.gov/news/2017-edition-of-the-massachusetts-guide-to-evidence-now-
available [https://perma.cc/7JZG-G8YY]; see also Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 
1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (adopting the Daubert rationale). 
 170. Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 varies significantly from the federal rule, providing: 
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other 
specialized information.  To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a 
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Oklahoma171 2013 3 
South Dakota 2011 2 
Utah172 2007 13 
Vermont 2004 7 
West Virginia 2014 2 
Wisconsin 2011 11 
 
 
procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following 
apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is 
objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, 
facts, or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the 
theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will 
yield an accurate result.  
OHIO R. EVID. 702. 
 171. The Oklahoma rule provides, using the same language as the federal rule, “(1) The 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably 
to the facts of the case.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2702 (West 2017). 
 172. Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods 
that are underlying in the testimony 
(1) are reliable, 
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
UTAH R. EVID. 702. 
